

Cyber Insurance Trends and Predictions

Impacts of Regulatory Changes, Threats, and Cyber Insurance

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SEC Rule Proposals

- Investment Adviser Rules
- Broker-Dealer and Market Participant Rules
- Regulation S-P
- Reg SCI
- Outsourcing Rule



SEC PUBLIC COMPANY CYBER RULE

- Board and Officer Cyber Expertise
- Policies and Procedures
- Risk Factors
- Business Description
- MD&A
- Material Events



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CURRENT CYBERSECURITY LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

Federal Laws:

- SEC Rules
- Bank Secrecy Act
- FISMA & CISA
- GLBA
 - FTC Safeguards Rule
 - SEC Regulation S-P
- FTC Unfair & Deceptive Trade Practices

State Laws:

- [New York] NY DFS / NY SHIELD
- [California] CCPA / CPRA
- [Massachusetts]201 CMR 17
- [Connecticut] Public Act 59
- [Ohio] DataProtection Act
- Various State Unfair
 & Deceptive Trade
 Practices




Cyber Insurance Trends and Predictions

Threat Landscape

- Hygiene and lack of monitoring
- GeoPolitical/Nation State sophisticated Attacks (APT)
- Unauthorized Access (Insider/External User, Network, System)
- Vulnerabilities
- Lack of data mapping and location awareness
- Poor User guardrails and trainings
- Regulatory Compliance

Cyber Insurance Market Influences

- General policy that include Cyber Insurance and Cyber Insurance Claim Rates
- Causes for Cyber Insurance Claims (drives minimum requirements [currently Ransomware Supplement])
- Anticipation of future threat impacts



Top Cyber Threats and Fraud

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Account Takeover	Compromised Credentials	DoS Attack	Open Redirection	Social Engineering Attack
Advanced Persistent Threat	Credential Dumping	Drive-by Download Attack	Pass the Hash	Spyware
AWS Attacks	Credential Reuse Attack	Insider Threat	Phishing (Payloads, Spear, Whale)	SQL Injection
Application Access Token	Credential Stuffing	IoT Threats	Password Spraying	Supply Chain Attack
Bill Fraud	Cross-Site Scripting	IoMT Threats	Privileged User Compromise	System Misconfiguration
Brute Force Attack	Crypto Jacking	Macro Viruses	Ransomware	Zoom Child Processing
Business Invoice Fraud	Data from Information Repositories	Malicious Powershell	Ransomware as a service	Typosquatting
Cloud Access Management	DDoS Attack	Man-in-the-Middle Attack	Router and Infrastructure Compromise	Water hole attack
Cloud Crypto Mining	Disabling Security Tools	Masquerade Attack	Shadow IT	Wire Attack
Command and Control	DNS Attacks (Hijacking, Tunneling, Amplification)	Meltdown and Spectre Attack	Service Account Compromise	Zero-Day Exploit PONDURANCE

Networking Sniffing

Simjacking

Anatomy of a Breach

Reconnaissance	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access	Execution 12 techniques	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion 40 techniques	Credential Access	Discovery 29 techniques	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 13 techniques
Active Scanning (2)	II Acquire	Drive-by	Command and	Account	Abuse Elevation	Abuse Elevation Control	Adversary-in-the-	Account Discovery (4)	II Exploitation of	Adversary-in-the-	Application Layer	Automated	Account Access
Gather Victim Host Information (4)	Infrastructure (a) Compromise	Compromise Exploit Public-Facing	Scripting Interpreter (a) Container	Manipulation (4)	Mechanism (4)	Mechanism (4) Access Token	Middle (2) Brute Force (4)	Application Window Discovery	Remote Services Internal	Middle (2) Archive Collected	Protocol (4) Communication	Exfiltration (1) Data Transfer Size	Removal Data Destruction
Gather Victim Identity	Accounts (2)	Application	Administration Command	Boat or Lagan	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Manipulation (1)	Credentials from	Browser Bookmark	Spearphishing	Data (2)	Through Removable Media	Limits	Data Encrypted for
Information (2) Gather Victim Network	Compromise Infrastructure (t)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Autostart Execution (15)	Boot or Logon Autostart	BiTS Jobs Build Image on Host	Password Stores (s) Exploitation for	Discovery Cloud Infrastructure	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Capture Automated	Data Encoding (2)	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (3)	Data Manipulation (2)
Information (a)	Develop Capabilities (4)	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Boot or Logon Initialization	Execution (12)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files	Credential Access	Discovery	Remote Service Session	Collection	Data Obfuscation (3)	Exfiltration Over	Defacement (2)
Gather Victim Org Information (4)	Establish	Phishing (a)	Inter-Process	Scripts (3)	Boot or Logon Initialization	or Information	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard	Hijacking (z)	Browser Session Hijacking	Dynamic Resolution (2)	C2 Channel	Disk Wipe (2)
Phishing for Information (a)	Accounts (2) Obtain Capabilities (6)	Replication Through Removable Media	Communication (2) Native API	Browser Extensions Compromise Client	Scripts (3) Create or Modify	Deploy Container Direct Volume Access	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object	Remote Services (s)	Clipboard Data	Encrypted Channel (2)	Other Network Medium (1)	Endpoint Denial of Service (4)
Search Closed Sources (2)	Stage Capabilities (5)	Supply Chain Compromise (2)	Scheduled Task/Job (a)	Software Binary	System Process (4)	Domain Policy	Input Capture (a)	Discovery	Through Removable Media	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over	Firmware Corruption
Search Open Technical Databases (s)		Trusted Relationship	Shared Modules	Create Account (2)	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Modification (2)	Modify	Container and Resource Discovery	Software	Data from	Ingress Tool Transfer	Physical Medium (1)	Inhibit System
Search Open		Valid Accounts (4)	Software Deployment Tools	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Escape to Host	Execution Guardrails (1) Exploitation for Defense	Authentication Process (4)	Domain Trust Discovery	Deployment Tools Taint Shared	Configuration Repository (x)	Multi-Stage Channels	Exfiltration Over	Recovery Network Denial of
Websites/Domains (2) Search Victim-Owned			System Services (2)	Event Triggered Execution (15)	Event Triggered Execution (15)	Exploitation for Detense Evasion	Network Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery	Content	Data from Information	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Web Service (z)	Service (2)
Websites			User Execution (2)	External Remote	Exploitation for	File and Directory Permissions Modification (2)	OS Credential Dumping (a)	Group Palicy Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication	Repositories (2)	Non-Standard Port	Transfer	Resource Hijacking
			Windows Management	Services	Privilege Escalation	Hide Artifacts (9)	Steal Application	Network Service Scanning	Material (4)	Data from Local System	Protocol Tunneling	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Service Stop
			Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (11)	Hijack Execution Flow (11)	Hijack Execution Flow (11)	Access Token Steal or Forge	Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing	-	Data from Network Shared Drive	Proxy (a)		System Shutdown/Reboot
				Implant Internal Image	Process Injection (11)	Impair Defenses (9)	(4) Kerberos Tickets	Password Policy Discovery	-	Data from	Remote Access Software		
				Modify	Scheduled Task/Job (e)	Indicator Removal on Host (a)	Steal Web Session Cookie	Peripheral Device Discovery		Removable Media	Traffic Signaling (1)		
				Authentication Process (d)	Valid Accounts (4)	Indirect Command	Two-Factor	Permission Groups		Data Staged (2)	Web Service (2)		
				Office Application Startup (e)		Execution Masquerading (7)	Authentication Interception	Discovery (2) Process Discovery		Email Collection (3) Input Capture (4)		_	
				Pre-OS Boot (g)		Modify Authentication	Unsecured Credentials (7)	Query Registry	-	Screen Capture	-		
				Scheduled		Process (4)		Remote System Discovery	1	Video Capture			
				Task/Job (e) Server Software		Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (4)	n i	Software Discovery (1)					
				Component (4)	•	Modify Registry		System Information Discovery					
				Traffic Signaling (1)		Modify System Image (2)	"	System Location	in .				
				Valid Accounts (4)		Network Boundary Bridging (1)	"	Discovery (1) System Network	-				
						Obfuscated Files or Information (a)	n e	Configuration Discovery (1)	"				
						Pre-OS Boot (s)	ii	System Network Connections Discovery					
						Process Injection (11)		System Owner/User Discovery					
						Reflective Code Loading		System Service Discovery	1				
						Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit		System Time Discovery	1				
	~~		~	7		Signed Binary Proxy		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (2)					
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r running (PC PC		Signed Script Proxy Execution (1)	н						

Cyber Insurance Trends and Predictions

Historic Influences

Security Threat	Resulting Cyber Insurance Requirement			
Ransomware	Backups, Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) /Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (MDR)			
Business Email Compromise	MFA, 24/7 Monitoring			
Credential Compromise	Multi-Factor Authentication			
AD Service Account Compromise	Reduction in service accounts/high degree of security of systems and access/MFA			
Privileged Account Compromise	24/7 logging and monitoring of Privileged Account Escalations			
User Awareness Training	User Training, Testing and Phishing Testing			
System and Software Vulnerabilities	Vulnerability Scanning and Patch Management			
User Errors	Awareness Training			
Lack of System Inventory	Basic system inventory and active awareness/MAC Management PONDURANCE			

Evolving Threats: Russia



Hackers have taken sides:

- Those that support Ukraine
- Those that support Russia

- Russia has hired the Russia aligned malware developers and contractors to launch attacks against 0-day attacks:
 - USA Targets (military, financial, infrastructure)
 - Companies that have withdrawn from Russia
 https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-400-companies-have-withdrawn-russia-some-remain-
- US Government continues to walk the line between acts of war and cyber





Suspected Breach



What Would Make You Think You Have a Breach?

The obvious

- You get a ransom demand
- You receive notice from law enforcement or a service provider
- You receive an alert by a third-party
- You detect it

Suspicion and the less obvious

- System performance
- Dark Web data



Did Data Get Exfiltrated?

The obvious

- Proof and disclosure by the offender
- Notification by a third-party
- Real-time alerting (MDR, SIEM, DLP)
- Audit Records/DFIR Analysis

Suspicion and the less obvious

- Has it likely been stolen given the situation
- Claims by the offender, but no sample proof
- System access but no audit records
- Logical exposure scenario
- Dark Web data



Anatomy of a Breach





Anatomy of a Breach

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COMMAND and CONTROL

Finalize continuous access to target systems and plan for undetected exfiltration

COLLECTION

Identify ways to collect data for exfiltration and ways to access and encrypt data (Ransomware)

LATERAL MOVEMENT

Expand to high value targets or jump points to high value targets

DISCOVERY

Identify high value data for extraction and encryption (Ransomware)



RECONNAISSANCE and RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Identification of weaknesses or broadly known weaknesses and associated tool developments to exploit weakness

ACCESS

Gaining access into a target environment without detection

EXECUTION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEDGED ESCALATION, and CREDENTIAL ACCESS

Now establish an undetected landing point in which to expand from and identify ways to expand from the entry point

DEFENSE EVASION

Continually limit activities and expansion of access and footprint in ways they look like normal traffic or are undetectable



We Have a Breach

What are your priorities in responding to a breach?



Risk to your revenues/mission



Risk to your reputation



Risk to your regulatory requirements



Risk to your safety






Anatomy



Investigation and Validation

UNDERSTANDING THE BREACH



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Investigation

- Validation of breach
- Let legal be your protective umbrella
- Relative peer comparison and meeting minimal requirements
- Roles & responsibilities of active parties



Remedies & Preservation of Evidence

UNDERSTANDING THE BREACH Verify Data REGAIN TRUST Accessed IN NETWORK SECURE THE SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE Track & **Identify & Recover Lost Fix Technical** Data Causes Preserve **Evidence of CONDUCT DATA Incident FORENSICS Remediation &** External Discovery **Evidence Preservation** Notifications Litigation Legal & Business Prepare for Investigation Lessons Risk/NotificationAnalysis Round 2 Learned

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Remediation/Evidence Preservation

Root Cause Analysis and Remediation


- Classification of data compromised
- Where is it
- What are the routes and dependent systems to access data
- Who has access and controls in place
- Visibility in place
- Remediation capabilities


Preserve evidence quickly

Communicate – frequently... and confidently when appropriate

Legal & Risk Analysis and Notification Requirements

UNDERSTANDING THE BREACH





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Compliance & Risk Analysis

Privilege


Notification Compliance

Communications Plan (internal/external)

- Consider other points of view
- Don't forget about your employees

Documentation

ROUND 2 – Here It Comes Again



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Be prepared... immediately

Warn employees to be prepared


Areas of improvements, failures, friction and risk

Areas to reduce remediation time during next breach

- Technologies
- People Roles and responsibilities
- Processes What to do, when to do it, and how to do it ... actions by roles and responsibility

Properly controlled information access

Litigation



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Litigation

- Industry fines and activities
- Customer actions
- Employees actions
- Legal mitigation



What should we have done?

What did we learn?

Is there a simple answer?



Simplified Recommendation



Single-factor
authentication is
compromised more
often than any one
vector. Implement
stronger
authentication
solutions and don't
make exceptions.
Build monitoring at a
user level.



Simplified Recommendation





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Know what assets you have and keep them patched. #2 most compromised vector. 1) few companies have an accurate inventory of assets, 2) they almost never keep them properly patched consistently across the enterprise, and 3) often, non-production, critical systems aren't properly prioritized



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Communications
and User
Awareness
Training and
continuous role
playing is critical.
You can reduce
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average user.

1) train and test, 2) leverage email gateways, 3) Weed out the dummies and address, 4) Phish and Phish



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Threats are 24/7, so must be your detection and response capabilities.



Simplified Recommendation











Malware is not

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going anywhere.
We assume you have client-based anti-virus running, which is a start.
Enrich AV with network malware detection, sandboxing technologies and application

whitelisting.

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Simplified Recommendation













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Malware is not going anywhere.
We assume you have client-based anti-virus running, which is a start.
Enrich AV with

detection,
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network malware

Containerize and Encrypt all mobile devices!

1) Be careful to understand what MDMs do and don't do, 2) understand BYOD tradeoffs, 3) forecast – a reckoning is coming within mobile 3) containerize confidential data

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Simplified Recommendation













Single-factor authentication is compromised more often than any one vector. Implement stronger authentication solutions and don't make exceptions. Build monitoring at a user level.

Know what assets you have and keep them patched. #2 most compromised vector. 1) few companies have an accurate inventory of assets, 2) they almost never keep them properly patched consistently across the enterprise, and 3) often. non-production. critical systems aren't properly prioritized

Communications and User Awareness Training and continuous role playing is critical. You can reduce risk for the average user.

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Modernize your 24/7 detection capabilities with MDR/MxDR. Threats are 24/7, so must be your detection and response capabilities.

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We assume you have client-based anti-virus running, which is a start. Enrich AV with network malware detection, sandboxing technologies and application whitelisting.

Containerize and **Encrypt all mobile** devices!

1) Be careful to understand what MDMs do and don't do, 2) understand BYOD tradeoffs. 3) forecast – a reckoning is coming within mobile 3) containerize confidential data

Threat Intelligence if operationalized is powerful.

1) If it's in the news, it's probably too late, 2) customer specific intel and monitoring is critical, 3) A key is knowing what the next looming threat might look like and how to plan, recognize, respond and mitigate it as necessary.

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Simplified Recommendation



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Continually progress forward with a plan by understanding your gaps.

Identify and prioritize known area of weaknesses. Have a plan and execute... moving forward is better than paralysis through analysis.



Continual Cyber Risk Reduction

Policy and Control Management

Controls should support Policies and context starts with Business Context.

- Business Risk
 - Safety
 - Reputation
 - Regulation
 - Revenue/Mission
- What gaps exist in what you documented you do verse operationally what you really do

Contextual Management

- IT Inventory
- Vulnerability Status
- Penetration Testing
- User Risk

Threat and IOC Awareness

- Threat Intel with Indicators of Compromise
- Realtime Surface
 Awareness
- Reverse Engineering and IOC Threat Analysis
- Honeypot





Questions?



Thank You!

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